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Abstract. Using a dynamic approach, employing data on job mobility, we demonstrate that 
university workers’ marginal willingness to pay for reducing commuting distance is about 
€0.25 per kilometre travelled. This corresponds to a marginal willingness to pay for reducing 
commuting time of about 75% of the net average hourly wage. For females, the willingness to 
pay is substantially higher than for males. It is also substantially higher for workers that work 
few hours per day, as predicted by theory. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a large literature which shows the importance of distance of students regarding 
educational choices, but the cost of commuting for university workers has been completely 
ignored. This is rather surprising because many high-quality universities in the world are 
located at expensive locations (e.g. in the centre of London). Presumably, these locations are 
attractive to students but for workers, who may be less willing to pay a premium to work at 
expensive locations; this usually implies that either housing or commuting costs are high 
compared to alternative jobs. In many (European) countries where wage scales are set at a 
national level, universities in expensive city centres have little possibility to compensate 
workers for high commutes which, at least theoretically, results in a misallocation of 
(potential university) workers over jobs. 
In the current paper, we aim to estimate the university workers’ time cost of 
commuting by using a dynamic methodology approach that use revealed preference data and 
derives this cost from the effects of commuting distance and wages on workers’ quitting 
behaviour. We apply this approach to workers for whom the monetary costs of travel are 
largely reimbursed. Our methodology avoids the assumption of a competitive labour market, 
which is important in the context of universities, which have been shown to have monopsony 
power (Ransom, 1993, Barbezat, 2004). Given a competitive labour market, hedonic wage 
approaches are widely applied, but have been shown to induce biased estimates, in particular 
in environments where workers search for other jobs (Hwang et al., 1992; 1998). 
Compared to previous studies that use a similar methodology (e.g. Manning, 2003a; 
2003b; van Ommeren and Fosgerau, 2009), our application offers two methodological  
advantages. First, we focus on workers from one university who share the same workplace 
location, so many – difficult to observe – differences related to employer’ industry and 
workplace location are controlled for (see, Zax, 1991; Villanueva, 2007; Gruetter and Lalive, 
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2009). Second, we use administrative data that contain detailed information about wages, so 
we largely avoid the measurement-in-wage problem, common in survey data, which biases 
the estimates (Van Ommeren and Hazans, 2008). In the context of commuting, it is important 
that our data are also informative about the presence of other transport-related fringe benefits 
(monetary travel subsidies, on-site parking permits) that determine largely the monetary cost 
of commuting, and precise information about jobs (the type of function, career opportunities). 
Furthermore, we have rather precise information about the hours worked per day (as well as 
number of days per week). This is relevant as theory predicts that workers with few daily 
work hours have a higher time cost of commuting (Manning, 2003a). To test this theory is not 
only relevant as it explains why (female) workers with few working hours commute less, it 
also helps us to understand the relationship between labour supply and commuting, a 
relationship which has received much attention in the theoretical literature (Parry and Bento, 
2001; Arnott, 2007; Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010).  
 The structure of the paper is the following: Section 2 provides the theoretical 
methodology to derive workers’ willingness to pay for commuting time. Section 3 contains 
the data description. The empirical analysis is presented in Section 4, while Section 5 offers 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Theory 
In the current paper, we will use a dynamic search methodology approach to identify workers' 
willingness to pay for job attributes (e.g. commuting time), introduced in the seminal paper by 
Gronberg and Reed (1994). 1  It is essentially assumed that employed workers have to search 
for other jobs that are offered with a certain probability given an endogenously chosen search 
                                               
1
 We follow Van Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009) who have extended this approach by relaxing some 
of the underlying assumptions. For empirical applications, see, among others, Manning (2003a, 
2003b), Dale-Olsen (2006) and Isacsson and Swärdh (2007). 
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effort. Each worker has a job which provides a wage and job attributes and workers know the 
distribution of wages and job attributes of other jobs. Given an offer, workers have to accept 
or reject jobs.  
The main idea of this approach is to use information about employees' job quitting 
behaviour (or job search behaviour). Given stationarity assumptions on the search 
environment, the employees' marginal willingness to pay for a job attribute is then obtained 
from the ratio of the marginal effect of the job attribute on the probability to quit and the 
marginal effect of the wage on the probability to quit (Van Ommeren and Fosgerau, 2009). 
More formally, 
 
                            
/ Pr( job quit) Pr( job quit)/
/x
v xMWP
v w x w
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
≡ =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
, (1) 
where MWPx is the workers' marginal willingness to pay for attribute x, v is the workers' 
current utility of a job, which is a function of job attribute x and wage w (∂v/∂w>0), and 
Pr(job quit) denotes the probability that a worker voluntarily leaves the organization. This 
result is intuitive: employees attach a certain (dis)utility to job attributes as well as to wages, 
which is revealed through the likelihood that employees quit if workers are confronted with a 
marginal change in w and x. We will  now focus on one job attribute: commuting time. 
To estimate (1), one has to put some restrictions on the functional form of Pr(job quit). 
If it is assumed that Pr( job quit) ( log log )x wf x wβ β= + , where βx and βw < 0 are parameters 
to be estimated, logx is the logarithm of commuting time x, logw is the logarithm of w, and f is 
an arbitrary continuous function (increasing in its argument), then:  
 .
x
x
w
wMWP
x
β
β=  (2) 
Hence, to derive MWPx and therefore the workers' cost of commuting, it is sufficient to obtain 
estimates of βx and βw.  
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The above specification of f ignores interaction effects between commuting time and 
other variables. According to theory, the length of the working day is important, because the 
MWPx is proportional to the inverse of the daily hours of work, denoted by h (see, Manning, 
2003a). This is intuitive as workers with few working hours per day apparently have high 
opportunity costs of working. To capture this, we include also the ratio of log distance and 
daily hours in f, so Pr( job quit) ( log log / log )x xh wf x x h wβ β β= + + , where βw < 0 and βx + 
βw /h < 0. The MWPx must be changed accordingly and now it reads as follows: 
 
 .
x xh
x
w w
w wMWP
x xh
β β
β β= +  (3) 
So, to estimate MWPx, one must estimate βx, βw and βxh. 
 
3. Data Description 
We focus on employees of the VU University in Amsterdam, which is (accidentally) located 
at the most expensive location in the Netherlands.2 All employees work at the same workplace 
location. One of the main characteristics of this location, relevant to the current application, is 
that it is at walking distance from a train station, at cycling distance from the city centre and 
many suburbs of Amsterdam and only a couple of minutes drive from a major, although 
heavily congested, highway. We use detailed administrative data for employees who are 
younger than the compulsory retirement age (65 years), to limit the impact of involuntary 
transitions into retirement, and who are on a permanent contract. As the involuntary quit rate 
of personnel on permanent contracts is negligible, we may safely assume that all quits are 
voluntary, as required by the theoretical framework detailed in Section 2. The data refer to the 
                                               
2
 We believe the choice of an expensive location has been accidental. When the VU university was established as 
this location was not expensive. 
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month February in the years 2003 until 2010, which allows us to calculate annual quit rates.3 
In total, we have 19,554 observations about quitting behaviour from 5,303 employees.4 
We have information on a range of workers’ characteristics: age, commuting distance, 
gender and hourly gross wage. Most studies focus on wages to derive the workers' marginal 
willingness to pay but one may also use other monetary job attributes. In our application, 
employees who travel by public transport receive a reimbursement of about 50% to 70% of 
the travel cost, whereas other employees, if the commuting distance exceeds 10 km, receive a 
reimbursement of € 0.04 per one-way km per day, up to a maximum of € 65 per month. One 
might consider to use a reimbursement is an additional factor in the quit decision. However, 
since the reimbursement is small relative to the salary, about 4% of the gross wage, we have 
included it in the gross wage. Distinguishing between these monetary components does not 
change the results.  
Furthermore, we use weekly hours, number of days worked per week as control 
variables.5 We also use information on daily hours worked which we use to interact with 
commuting distance. We derive average daily hours by dividing weekly hours by number of 
workdays. This creates some measurement error, because for some workers daily hours vary 
per day of the week (e.g. they work 4 days 8 hours and one day 4 hours). For the last two 
waves of the sample, we have detailed information on the exact number of hours worked per 
day of the week. It appears that only 8% of workers vary daily hours over the week. Thus, the 
average number of daily hours is a rather accurate measure. 6 
                                               
3
 The 2010 wave is merely used to determine quits. So, the dummy variable quitit is 1 when worker i is 
observed in wave t but not in wave t+1. 
4
 We exclude few observations with a commute longer than 150 km, a commuting reimbursement 
above 20% of the salary, daily working hours less than 1.5 or in excess of 10 or a hourly wage above 
€100. 
5
 Using daily hours rather than weekly hours or number of days worked per week generates identical 
results to the results presented here. 
6
 We also lack information about the start time (see Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2012). 
However, as a rule, most workers and in particular faculty members are quite flexible regarding time. 
7 
 
Administrative data usually do not contain information about workers’ educational 
level. Fortunately, the university’s personnel files contain information about the workers’ 
academic title. We were thus able to infer educational level, distinguishing between workers 
without university degree, with a Master degree or a PhD.7 
We know workers' job title, which allows us to distinguish between faculty members, 
academic support staff (teaching and research support functions, including student relations) 
and administrative staff.8 We have also incomplete information about (the use and eligibility 
of) parking permits, which we use as a control variable. Parking permits are provided to 
eligible employees (at a cost of less than € 1 per day), but as only 30% of the employees who 
are eligible apply for it, the policy is not restrictive for most workers and few workers travel 
by car who don’t receive a parking permit.9 We also control for the use of public transport.10 
These data indicate that at least half of workers commute by bicycle. 
We also control for recent promotions. This is relevant in a search context but usually 
difficult to control for. We are able to do so, because the wage policy of the university is 
based on 10 broad wage scales; wage scales are further subdivided into maximally 12 steps. 
Advancement within a scale is, almost always, automatic: one step per year. Advancement 
between scales, however, is not automatic: passage onto the next wage scale is conditional on 
a successful job evaluation. Hence, each progression in scale implies a promotion.11  
                                               
7
 We also know if the field of study was technical (i.e., engineering) or law, but distinction by field 
appeared not to be relevant for the results presented. 
8
 Faculty members, academic support and administrative staff represent respectively 26, 17, and 57% 
of the workforce on a permanent contract. 
9
 Eligibility depends on the ratio of car and public transport travel times. In addition, some parking 
permits are allocated by faculties. Unfortunately we were not able to recover complete information on 
permits allocated by faculties as information for the first years of our sample was particularly poor. 
10
 Information about public transport is derived from annual commuting reimbursements that depend 
on the mode of transport. Probably this understates public transport use by several percentage points. 
Company cars are important fringe benefits in the Netherlands (Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau and van 
Ommeren, 2011), but not provided by public organisations such as universities. 
11
 The dummy variable promotionit is 1 when workers i is observed in wage scale H in t-1 and in wage 
scale H+1 (or higher) at time t. 
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In addition, we aim to control for the lack of promotion opportunities. Normal career 
progression entails that workers move to the next scale when they are between the 5th and 7th 
step. Hence, most workers that are relatively high up in the step level are either less 
productive than it may have been expected a priori or have attained a scale level such that 
promotions are difficult to realise within the university. In particular, workers at the very top 
of the scale are likely to have been passed on for promotion many times in a row, and it is 
thus very unlikely that they will be promoted in the future. Since the lack of promotion 
possibilities will affect the workers’ expectation of wage increases with the current employer, 
we have included a dummy variable signalling when a worker is at the top of the scale (e.g. 
step 10 to 12). 
The average one-way commuting distance of workers is 22 km, so the daily 
commuting distance travelled is 44 km.12 The average full-time equivalent gross yearly wage 
is €47,665, above the average gross salary of Dutch workers (about €32,000). The average 
gross hourly wage is €26.5, which amounts to an average gross daily wage of €212. Most 
workers face a marginal income tax rate of about 50%, consequently net average daily wage 
is about €106 and the net hourly wage is just above €13. Summary statistics of other variables 
used in the analysis are provided in the appendix. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
To estimate the workers’ marginal willingness to pay for commuting time, we have estimated 
the workers’ probability to quit, using a worker random effects logit model (Model 1). The 
results are presented in Table 1 in columns 1 (coefficients) and 2 (marginal effects). It appears 
that the distance to daily hours variable has a positive effect (0.844 with a standard error of 
0.444), although it is imprecisely estimated. The effect of distance itself is highly insignificant 
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 In the Netherlands, the average one-way commuting distance is about 17 km, it raises to 21 km 
among workers with university degrees. 
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(t-value is 0.15). Because a standard likelihood ratio test shows that both distance variables 
are jointly highly significant (χ2(2) = 12.42), we present the results of a model that only 
includes the distance to daily hours variable (Model 2). This is equivalent to setting βx=0 so 
that the entire first term in equation 3 equals zero. The difference in the log likelihood of both 
models is trivial and in terms of interpretation the results are identical.  
We find a negative effect of wage, βw = -1.216 (s.e. 0.169), whereas the effect of the 
ratio of commuting distance to daily hours, βxh, is positive (0.889 with a standard error of 
0.219).13 This implies that the workers' willingness to pay to avoid a longer commute is 
decreasing in daily working hours, in line with Manning (2003a). The specification implies 
that the MWPx for a full-time worker who works 8 hours a day is half the MWPx for a part-
time worker who works only 4 hours a day. 
Equation (3) implies, evaluated at the mean, that the average MWPx to reduce the 
commute by one kilometre is €0.490 (s.e. 0.130), so €0.245 (s.e. 0.065) per kilometre 
travelled.14 Given an average commuting speed of 40 km/h, this corresponds to an average 
willingness to pay of about €9.80 to avoid one hour of commuting (with a standard error of 
2.59), about 75% of the average net hourly wage. 
It is plausible that this estimate predominantly refers to time losses. Usually, it is 
thought that monetary costs and the monetary value of the time losses are of the same 
magnitude (van Ommeren and Fosgerau, 2009). However, workers who travel by public 
transport receive an imbursement between 50 to 70% of the expenses, so for these workers the 
costs predominantly refer to time losses. Also other workers received a monetary 
compensation (up to € 60 per month), as parking costs are quite small (less than € 1 per day).  
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 We have also estimated models including a quadratic term in log wage. Although the latter term 
appears significant, within the relevant wage range, the effect on the probability to quit is negative. 
14
 Standard errors are calculated using the delta method. The average daily net wage is €106, daily 
work hours is 7.27, and one-way commuting distance is 22 km. 
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Table1: Random effects logit estimates of the probability to quit 
  Model 1   Model 2   
Dependent variable: quit Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects Coefficients 
Marginal 
Effects 
log wage -1.216* -0.105*   -1.216* -0.105* 
(0.169) (0.015)   (0.169) (0.015) 
log distance 0.010 0.001   
(0.074) (0.006)   
log distance/daily hours  0.844 0.073   0.898* 0.078* 
(0.444) (0.038)   (0.219) (0.019) 
no promotion opportunities 0.154* 0.013*   0.154* 0.013* 
(0.076) (0.007)   (0.076) (0.007) 
recent promotion -0.682* -0.059*   -0.682* -0.059* 
(0.108) (0.009)   (0.108) (0.009) 
public transport -0.427* -0.037*   -0.425* -0.037* 
(0.085) (0.007)   (0.082) (0.007) 
parking permit -0.107 -0.009   -0.105 -0.009 
(0.156) (0.013)   (0.155) (0.013) 
Work hours 
      
Hours worked per week / 38 1.098* 0.095*   1.140* 0.099* 
(0.498) (0.043)   (0.397) (0.034) 
1 day per week 1.939* 0.168*   1.968* 0.170* 
(0.394) (0.034)   (0.332) (0.029) 
2 days per week 1.452* 0.126*   1.475* 0.128* 
(0.317) (0.027)   (0.268) (0.023) 
3 days per week 0.912* 0.079*   0.928* 0.080* 
(0.220) (0.019)   (0.186) (0.016) 
4 days per week 0.302* 0.026*   0.310* 0.027* 
(0.123) (0.011)   (0.108) (0.009) 
Education 
      
master degree -0.514* -0.045*   -0.514* -0.044* 
(0.102) (0.009)   (0.101) (0.009) 
no university degree -0.857* -0.074*   -0.856* -0.074* 
(0.127) (0.011)   (0.127) (0.011) 
Type of job 
      
faculty -1.340* -0.116*   -1.339* -0.116* 
(0.115) (0.010)   (0.115) (0.010) 
administrative -0.718* -0.062*   -0.719* -0.062* 
(0.097) (0.008)   (0.097) (0.008) 
Number of observations 19,554 19,554 
Number of individuals 5,303 5,303 
Rho 0.301* 0.301* 
(0.031) (0.031) 
Log likelihood -6273.493 -6273.502 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *: significant at 5%. The model also contains controls for year (7 
dummies), civil status (4 dummies), gender, age, age squared and a dummy for two jobs at the university. 
Reference groups of the variables in parentheses: number of working days (5), education (PhD), type of career 
(teaching support). 
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Furthermore, our sample contains a rather high (but for the Netherlands quite 
common) proportion of bicycle users for whom marginal monetary costs of travel are 
negligible.15 
We have tested this result using many alternative specifications. For example, we have 
tested if the disutility of commuting and the utility of wages vary among workers using a 
random coefficient specification (that is we let the coefficient of the wage and of the 
commuting distance to vary among workers). We found that the implied distribution of the 
coefficients is degenerate (has a variance very close to zero). We have also estimated models 
with other interactions and controls (e.g. weekly hours rather than daily hours; the logarithm 
of daily hours rather than daily hours), but this result remains robust. 
The MWPx differs strongly between full-time and part-time workers, because of 
differences in the hours worked per day. For full-time workers, MWPx is 0.222 (with a s.e. of 
0.059). The MWPx for workers on part-time jobs with 20 week hours per contract is almost 
twice as high: 0.396 (with a s.e. of 0.105). We have also estimated the model interacting both 
wage and the distance to the daily hours variable with part-time status. Both the interaction 
terms are far from statistically significant (with t-values of 0.25 and 0.70 respectively). 
Consequently, we are not able to detect any additional difference in the MWPx between part-
time and full-time workers when accounting for the difference in the daily number of working 
hours. 
We have also estimated models allowing for different impacts of wages and distance 
for faculty and non-faculty staff. We find that the effect of distance is somewhat higher for 
non-faculty workers.16 For non-faculty workers, MWPx equals 0.292 (s.e. 0.081), about 20% 
                                               
15
 The coefficient on distance remains positive and significant also when wage is not included in the 
quit regression, which implies that workers are not fully compensated for their commuting losses 
(Manning, 2003a; Stutzer and Frey, 2008). 
16
 This finding also holds if we interact distance with educational level. The effect of wage is 
statistically insignificant for faculty workers, which prevents us from interpreting the MWPx for 
faculty workers, but the results suggest that their MWPx is (much) lower. 
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higher than the population-average MWPx reported above. The effect of wage is statistically 
insignificant for faculty workers, which prevents us from interpreting the MWPx for faculty 
workers, but the results suggest that their MWPx is (much) lower.17 
Men and women usually experience different patterns of labour market transitions, so 
we have paid special attention to gender. We have re-estimated the models interacting wage 
and distance with gender. Using an average daily wage (distance) of €99 (38.74km) for 
women and of €116 (45.64km) for men, we obtain a MWPx of 0.122 (s.e. 0.073) for men and 
of 0.675 (s.e. 0.183) for women. The difference in the MWPx across the gender dimension is 
substantial, 0.553 (s.e. 0.193), and statistically significant. These results indicate that, 
consistent with Van Ommeren and Fosgerau (2009), and a large labour market literature 
which shows that women react stronger to changes in the labour market than men, women 
have a higher MWPx to pay than men. 
Control variables have the expected effects on the probability to quit. For example, 
career concerns are an important determinant of quitting decisions: recently promoted workers 
are less likely to quit and workers who have no promotion opportunities are more likely to 
quit. In addition, workers with a PhD are more likely to quit. We also find that the likelihood 
of quitting decreases almost linearly with the number of days worked. The probability to quit 
increases with the length of the working week, but the effect is only significant at 10% 
confidence level. Workers with two jobs at this organization are characterized by a lower 
likelihood of quitting. The effect of having a parking permit is not strong enough to be 
properly identified with our data. Workers commuting by public transport tend to quit less. 
This result makes sense when it is recognised that given short distances Dutch workers tend to 
use the bicycle whereas workers with long commutes who do not use public transport usually 
                                               
17
 This makes sense, because faculty members are not only higher educated than the average worker, 
they have also more specialized jobs and have more flexibility with regard to teleworking as well as 
work start hours, which is relevant to avoid peak congestion. Thus their characteristics mirror long-run 
trends towards increasing education, specialization and flexibility, which one observes nowadays. 
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live at residence locations where the supply of public transport is poor, so they have to rely on 
the car, but as the highways close to the university are highly congested, these workers face 
an unusual inconvenient commute. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The current paper estimates the university workers’ willingness to pay for commuting using 
data from the personnel files of a Dutch university, by means of a dynamic job search 
approach based on job quitting behaviour. So, we identify the willingness to pay using 
revealed preferences data, whereas the majority of studies rely on stated preferences (e.g. De 
Borger and Fosgerau, 2008). The approach does not rely on the restrictive assumption of a 
static fully-competitive labour market, see Hwang et al. (1998), which has been shown not to 
apply to university workers.  
Our preferred estimate, robust to alternative model specifications, implies that the 
university workers' willingness to pay to avoid a one kilometre increase in the commute is 
€0.245. Given assumptions on speed, and noting that these workers hardly pay for monetary 
costs of travel, this suggests a cost of commuting time of about 75% of the workers' average 
(net) hourly wage. The cost is strongly decreasing in the number of daily hours worked in line 
with theory,  and is higher for female and non-faculty workers. 
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Appendix 1: Summary statistics 
         Mean Standard Deviation
quits 0.124 0.330 
annual wage (thousand Euro) 47.652 18.349 
log wage 3.796 0.362 
commuting distance (km) 22.073 23.032 
log commuting distance 2.684 0.970 
no promotion opportunities 0.704 0.456 
recent promotion 0.109 0.312 
public transport 0.255 0.436 
parking permit 0.053 0.224 
Job characteristics  
two jobs (at the organization) 0.021 0.144 
number of weekly hours / 38 0.829 0.234 
number of daily hours 7.269 0.901 
Number of working days  
1 0.035 0.184 
2 0.044 0.206 
3 0.107 0.310 
4 0.213 0.410 
5 0.601 0.490 
Personal characteristics  
men 0.603 0.489 
age 45.493 10.260 
age squared (/100) 21.748 9.240 
Civil status  
married 0.514 0.500 
living together 0.141 0.348 
single 0.280 0.449 
widow (er) 0.008 0.089 
divorced 0.056 0.229 
Education  
PhD 0.328 0.470 
master degree 0.246 0.431 
no university degree 0.426 0.495 
Job type  
teaching support 0.166 0.373 
faculty 0.262 0.439 
administrative 0.572 0.495 
Number of observations 19,554 
Number of individuals 5,303   
 
 
